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I. INTRODUCTION
From the legendary Tuna/Dolphin case1 that triggered the
launching of the campaign against the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) by environmentalists in early 1990s, to the Shrimp/
* Associate Professor of Law, Department of International Business, National
Chengchi University, Taipei, TAIWAN.
1 Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 39S/155
(Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) (unadopted), available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinI.pdf; Report of the Panel,
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994)
(unadopted) [hereinafter Dolphin/Tuna Report].
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Turtle case2 after the establishment of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), trade-related environmental measures (TREMs)3 continue to
generate an intense debate of trade versus environment in the GATT/
WTO legal context. The controversies concerning the legality of
TREMs under the GATT/WTO, such as the application and interpreta-
tion of GATT Article XX4 and of other WTO agreements,' and addi-
tionally the relationship between the GATT/WTO and multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs) containing trade measures, have
yet to be settled in the GATT/WTO legal order. The Committee on
Trade and Environment (CTE), established under the WTO in 1995, is
tasked to undertake discussion on trade and environment issues in the
WTO and two of the ten items on its Working Programme relate to the
issues of TREMs.6 In the current Doha Round negotiation, trade and
2 See Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United
States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/
AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter jointly referred to as Shrimp/Turtle Panel and
Appellate Body Reports].
3 TREMs refer to trade restrictive measures adopted for the purpose of environ-
mental protection. Some scholars, such as Esty, use "environmental trade mea-
sures" when referring to such measures. See, e.g., DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE
GATT (Institute for International Economics 1994). Most of the literature, how-
ever, uses the term "trade-related environmental measures", which resembles sim-
ilar terms and concepts under the WTO. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-related
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Trade Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; Agreement on Trade-
related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Trade Instruments - Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMs]; Paul Demaret,
TREMs, Multilateralism, Unilateralism and the GATT, in TRADE & THE ENVIRON-
MENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 52, 52 (James Cameron et al., eds., 1994).
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX [hereinafter GATT].
5 See, e.g., Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Trade Instru-
ments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TBT
Agreement]; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Mea-
sures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 1A, Trade Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
6 Item 1 and Item 5, as recognized in the original 1994 CTE ten-point working
programme via the 1994 Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environ-
ment, are the relationship between the rules of the multilateral trading system
and the trade measures contained in MEAs, and between their dispute settlement
mechanisms. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision on Trade and Envi-
ronment of 14 Apr. 1994, MTN.TNC/45(MIN), Annex I (1994), available at http://
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environment are also on the negotiation agenda and the CTE in Spe-
cial Session (CTESS) is established to undertake this negotiation. One
of the negotiation mandates is to clarify the relationship between WTO
rules and specific trade obligations set out in MEAs.7 There has been,
however, little progress on this specific issue in the CTESS as of 2008.
Two types of legal controversies arise in the context of disputes
between GATT/WTO and TREMs, especially TREMs adopted under
the MEAs. First, there is potential conflict between two sets of sub-
stantive legal rules: the relationship between international trade rules
under the GATT/WTO and trade-related provisions under the MEAs.
Second, there is potential conflict between jurisdictions: both the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms under the WTO and those under the
MEAs can obtain jurisdiction concerning disputes arising from the ap-
plication of TREMs. s In the case of potential conflicts of legal rules,
there has been a large volume of relevant literature after the Tuna/
Dolphin case.9 The main focus in this area of debate includes, but is
not inclusive of: the application and interpretation of GATT Article
XX, in particular its preamble and sub-paragraphs (b) and (g),'o the
application and interpretation of relevant WTO covered agreements in
disputes involving TREMs, etc." Despite the lack of dispute concern-
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/56-dtenv e.htm; see generally, WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, Trade and Environment, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir
_e/envire.htm (providing an updated and detailed description of the CTE Work
Programme).
7 However, it is also stated that: "The negotiation shall be limited in scope to the
applicability of such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.
The negotiation shall not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a
party to the MEA in question." World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declara-
tion of 14 Nov. 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 31.i (2002) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration].
8 Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The Rela-
tionship Between the WTO Agreements and MEAs and Other Treaties, 35 J. WORLD
TRADE 1081, 1082 (2001).
9 For example, using "GATT Article XX AND disputes" as a key search term in the
Westlaw legal periodical database usually produces more than 400 journal arti-
cles. Using the same key search term and narrowing down the search years to the
last five years in the Lexis-Nexis database also produce more than 190 journal
articles.
10 See, e.g., Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau:
A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
739 (2001); John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts between Trade and
the Environment, 28 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 1 (2004).
11 See, e.g., Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues
of Shields over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305 (2004); Kevin C. Kennedy,
Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO: Lessons
and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 81 (2000).
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ing TREMs adopted under the authorization of an MEA, literature
abounds concerning the potential conflicts between legal rules of the
GATT/WTO and trade provisions contained in the MEAs, including
general discussion as well as more specific discussion on individual
MEAs,"2 and how to solve such conflict through treaty interpretation
or principles on conflicts of norms. 13 In comparison, there has been
less attention on discussing the issues of conflict of jurisdictions in the
application of TREMs. There is some literature on more general dis-
cussion on the relationship between dispute settlement mechanisms
under the WTO and the MEAs. 14 In addition, as there has been a
proliferation of international tribunals after the end of the Cold War,
the issue of conflicting jurisdictions, including debates on their posi-
tive and negative implications, has also attracted the attention of in-
ternational legal scholars in public international law.' 5
In the area of conflicting substantive legal rules, there have
been some disputes involving the applications of TREMs under the
GATT/WTO and, hence, the large volume of relevant literature. Nev-
ertheless, none of the TREMs in dispute were authorized or sanctioned
by any MEA. However, in the area of conflicting jurisdictions, there
has been one incident involving the European Community (EC) and
12 See generally DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE MONTREAL PRO-
TOCOL (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 1996); JONATHAN KRUEGER, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE BASEL CONVENTION (Earthscan Publications Ltd.1999); Cameron
Hutchison, International Environmental Law Attempts to be 'Mutually Supportive'
with International Trade Law: A Compatibility Analysis of the Cartagena Protocol
to the Convention on Biological Diversity with the World Trade Organisation
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 4 J. INT'L
WILDLIFE & POL'Y 1 (2001); Wen-chen Shih, The Relationship Between the Climate
Change Regime and the GATT/ WTO: Focusing on the Kyoto Mechanism, 34 NTU
L. REV. 179 (2005) [hereinafter Shih, Climate Change]; Wen-chen Shih, Multi-
lateralism and the Case of Taiwan in the Trade Environment Nexus-The Poten-
tial Conflict Between CITES and GATT/WTO, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 109 (1996)
[hereinafter Shih, Potential Conflict].
13 See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law: Praises
for the Prohibition Against "Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement, 33 J.
WORLD TRADE 87 (1999); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
14 See, e.g., Alexandra Gonzalez-Calatayud & Gabrielle Marceau, The Relation-
ship Between the Dispute-Settlement Mechanisms of MEAs and Those of the WTO,
11 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVT'L L. 275 (2002).
15 See generally YuVAIJ SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Oxford Univ. Press 2003); Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword:
Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of
International Judicial Bodies: The pieces of the puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
709 (1999).
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Chile concerning a TREM adopted by Chile on the conservation of
swordfish. According to its domestic fishery law, Chile prohibited the
use of its ports to unload swordfish by Spanish fishing fleets that ex-
port swordfish to the United States. The EC requested consultation
with Chile concerning this Chilean measure under the WTO in April
2000, alleging the violation of GATT/WTO rules of, inter alia, freedom
of transit. 6 In December 2000, Chile brought its own complaint to the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) against the EC
alleging the failure of the EC to comply with its obligations under the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to con-
serve swordfish. 7 This dispute was suspended under both the WTO
and the ITLOS after the EC and Chile reached an agreement and
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in January 2001. There has
been surprisingly little literature analyzing the implications of this
dispute on the ongoing debate of conflicting jurisdictions involving the
application of TREMs.' s
This article, thus, will focus on the following issues concerning
conflicting jurisdictions over such a dispute: can disputes arising from
the application of TREMs be settled under both the dispute settlement
mechanisms of the WTO and of the MEAs; Is it likely that such a dis-
16 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Chile-Measures Af-
fecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WT/DS193/1 (Apr. 26, 2000)
[hereinafter EC Swordfish Request for Consultations], available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds193-1(cr).pdf.
17 Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish
Stock in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile v. Eur. Cmty.), Case No. 7 (Int'l
Trib. L. of the Sea Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter the "Swordfish Case"], available at
http://www.itlos.org/casedocuments/2001/document-en-100.pdf.
18 UNCLOS is probably the only MEA which provides mandatory dispute settle-
ment procedures. See infra Part II. There are, thus, a few articles on whether
disputes involving TREMs concerning marine conservation should be brought to
the WTO or to the ITLOS. See, e.g., Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Should UNCLOS
or GATT/ WTO Decide Trade and Environment Disputes, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 287 (1998); Richard J. McLaughlin, Settling Trade-Related Disputes Over
the Protection of Marine Living Resources: UNCLOS or the WTO?, 10 GEO. INT'L
ENVT'L L. REV. 29 (1997). After the EC-Chilean dispute, there are only four jour-
nal articles that focus on this dispute known to this author. There is one article
offering a general overview to introduce the background of the EC-Chilean dis-
pute: Vaughan Lowe, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Survey for
2000, 16 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 549 (2001). There are, thus, only three
articles that conduct detailed analyses concerning this dispute: T. L. McDorman,
The Chile v EC Swordfish Case, 11 Y.B. INT'L ENVT'L L. 585 (2000); M. A. Orellana,
The Swordfish Dispute Between the EU and Chile at the ITLOS and the WTO, 71
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 55 (2002); John Shamsey, ITLOS vs. Goliath: The International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea Stands Tall with the Appellate Body in the Chil-
ean-EU Swordfish Dispute, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 513 (2002).
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pute be subject to multiple dispute settlement mechanisms; If the an-
swer is yes, does one of them have primary jurisdiction; If none of them
have primary jurisdiction, what are the implications of parallel juris-
dictions of disputes concerning the application of TREMs. The Chile-
Swordfish dispute continued to be suspended as of December 2008, but
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO adopted both the
Panel Report and the Appellate Body Report of the Mexico - Tax Mea-
sures on Soft Drink and Other Beverages, 19 an important case con-
cerning jurisdictional issues of the WTO panels, in March 2006.
Though this dispute does not involve the application of TREMs, can
the approach adopted by the WTO panel and Appellate Body in the
Mexico-Soft Drink case concerning the issue of conflicting jurisdictions
shed some light on the abovementioned questions? To answer these
research questions, this article will be structured as follows. Section I
will briefly introduce the concept of TREMs and offer some background
introduction to the EC-Chile Swordfish dispute indicating the signifi-
cance of this case in 'substantialising' the 'potential' conflict of jurisdic-
tions in the application of TREMs. Section II will focus on the issues of
conflicting jurisdictions: a brief introduction on the proliferation of in-
ternational tribunals and its associated problems will be noted at the
beginning, followed by a very brief introduction on the dispute settle-
ment mechanism of the WTO and the Mexico-Soft Drink case, and a
more detailed description on the dispute settlement mechanisms
under the MEAs, and a detailed discussion will be conducted to ana-
lyze which judicial forum has primary or/and sole jurisdiction in dis-
putes concerning the applications of TREMs. Through the design of
various possible scenarios in the EC-Chile swordfish dispute, Section
III will analyze the possibilities and implications of parallel and con-
flicting jurisdictions in a dispute concerning the application of TREMs
on the international legal order and how this might affect the use of
TREMs by an individual country.
II. TRADE-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND THE
CHILE-SWORDFISH DISPUTE
A. Trade-related Environmental Measures
Trade-related environmental measures (TREMs) are trade re-
strictive measures adopted for the purpose of environmental protec-
tion. Most literature classifies TREMs into two categories:
multilateral TREMs and unilateral TREMs.2 ° The former refers to
19 Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drink and Other Beverages, WT/
DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Soft Drink Panel Report]; Appellate Body Re-
port, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drink and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R,
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Soft Drink Appellate Body Report].
20 See, e.g., Demaret, supra note 3, at 52.
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trade restrictive measures set out or adopted under the authority of
MEAs whilst the latter refers to trade restrictive measures adopted
according to domestic laws of individual countries.2 '
All of the disputes concerning the applications of TREMs in the
GATT era and the WTO are unilateral TREMs, i.e. TREMs adopted in
accordance with domestic law.22 Examples of these include the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act in the Tuna/Dolphin disputes,2 3 the
U.S. Clean Air Act in the U.S. reformulated gasoline dispute,2 4 and the
U.S. Endangered Species Act in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute.2 5 If such
unilateral TREMs are based solely on domestic laws, a dispute arising
from the application of such TREMs rarely, in theory, results in a situ-
ation where multiple or conflicting jurisdictions arise, as dispute set-
tlement mechanisms under MEAs are not available under this
circumstance. If, however, the domestic law in question resembles or
is relevant to certain MEAs, it might bring more complications. For
example, when the domestic law in question is a means of implement-
ing substantive obligations under an MEA or decisions of the Confer-
ence of the Parties (COP) to the MEA or prescribes substantive legal
obligations relating to but stricter than an MEA, can TREMs adopted
according to such domestic laws be categorized as unilateral TREMs?
Demaret proposes adopting the following criteria: a TREM adopted ac-
cording to domestic laws can be considered as a multilateral TREM if
the objectives of such laws correspond to the objectives of an MEA that
are recognized by all the contracting parties.2 6 Take the 1973 Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) as an ex-
ample: if the domestic law authorizes trade restrictive measures
adopted to protect species listed in Annex I, II or II127 to the Conven-
21 Id.
22 Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 187 (Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman
eds., Earthscan Publications 2002).
23 See, e.g., Dolphin/Tuna Report, supra note 1.
24 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), available at www.
law.georgetown.edu/iiel/cases/US-Gasoline(panel).doc [hereinafter Gasoline Panel
Report]; Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996), available at www.world-
tradelaw. net / reports / wtoab / us-gasoline(ab).pdf25 See, e.g., Shrimp/Turtle Panel and Appellate Body Reports, supra note 2.
26 Demaret, supra note 3, at 59.
27 Under the CITES, species that are identified in accordance with a set of criteria
developed by the COP to the CITES as endangered are listed in Annex I, II, or III
according to their respective level of endangerments. Species threatened with ex-
tinction, which are or may be affected by trade, are identified and listed in Annex I
by the COP. Species that are not yet threatened with extinction, but may become
so if trade in specimens of such species is not regulated, are listed in Annex II.
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tion, such TREMs are to be considered "multilateral"; if, however, such
trade restrictive measures are introduced to protect species listed
under its domestic legal framework, such TREMs are then to be con-
sidered "unilateral".2" Such criteria, to a certain extent, seem to have
broadened the scope of multilateral TREMs for reasons to be explained
later.
Most literature refers to trade provisions set out in the 1973
CITES, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer (the Montreal Protocol), and the 1989 Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and
their Disposal (the Basel Convention) as typical "multilateral
TREMs."2 9 Disputes arising from the application of such "genuine"
multilateral TREMs can be subject to review by the dispute settlement
procedures of both the WTO and of the MEAs in question. According
to the "Matrix on Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral
Environmental Agreements", a document prepared by the WTO Secre-
tariat under the instruction of WTO Members to assist the negotiation
on trade and environment, there are fourteen MEAs containing trade
measures. ° MEAs containing TREMs mainly adopt trade measures
to achieve the following environmental objectives: to conserve endan-
gered species, to protect importing countries from being exposed to
hazardous materials, or to protect common resources. 3 1
There is less ambiguity in the definition of a TREM as multi-
lateral when the MEA in question specifically requires its parties to
adopt "trade restrictive" measures. The situation is less clear when
the MEA in question authorizes its parties to adopt "domestic" or "any"
measures to achieve the objectives of the MEA, or when the COP to
such MEA adopts decisions or resolutions that require or recommend
its parties to adopt certain trade restrictive measures. Can such
TREMs still be categorized as "multilateral"? This touches upon the
definitional question mentioned earlier when unilateral TREMs were
being discussed. The issue of what are trade specific trade obligations"set out" in MEAs, is currently subject to negotiation and ongoing de-
Annex III lists all species that have been identified by individual contracting par-
ties as subject to regulations of trade in their domestic jurisdictions. Trade in spe-
cies that are listed in Annex I, II, or III under the CITES are subject to different
levels of control. WILLEM WIJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION OF CITES 17 (CITES Sec-
retariat, 7th ed. 2003).
28 See Demaret, supra note 3, at 59.
29 See, e.g., id. at 53.
30 Committee on Trade and Environment, Note by the Secretariat: Matrix on
Trade Measures Pursuant to Selected Multilateral Environmental Agreements,
WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.4 (Mar. 14, 2007).
31 See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
942-46 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003).
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bate on trade and environment under the Doha negotiation. 3 2 From
the literal meanings of "set out" in "multilateral" environmental agree-
ments, it seems that such trade obligations must be adopted based on
decisions reached by the consensus of all or most of the contracting
parties to the MEA. The essential point, however, concerns the extent
of such consensus: should it refer to both the aims (environmental pro-
tection) and means (trade measures), or only to the aims of the MEA?
The above-mentioned criteria proposed by Demaret seem to suggest
the latter: trade restrictive measures can still be considered as "multi-
lateral TREMs" if the objective of such measures is commonly shared
by most of the contracting parties, albeit the MEA in question leaves
the means of implementations to the parties themselves.3 3 The crite-
ria offer a broader scope to the definition of "multilateral TREMs".
Considering that a holistic approach should be adopted to perceive the
regulatory regime under the MEAs, including both the aims and
means adopted by the provisions of the MEAs, such criteria seem to
have stretched the meaning of "set out" in MEAs a bit too far.
Another relevant ambiguity relates to the question of whether
trade measures adopted according to the decisions/resolutions of vari-
ous bodies or organs under the MEAs can be considered multilateral
TREMs. This question boils down to the meaning and explanation of"set out". If it is understood as "legally prescribed under" the MEAs,
then the answer to this question will depend on whether decisions and
resolutions adopted by various types of bodies or organs under the
MEAs are legally binding on the contracting parties to the MEA in
question. If such decisions and resolutions are considered to be bind-
ing, TREMs adopted under the authority of such decisions or resolu-
32 Paragraph 31(i) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration requested the WTO Mem-
bers to engage in negotiation that seeks to clarify the relationship between ex-
isting WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in the MEAs. World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. In several WTO Members' sub-
missions to the CTESS concerning the negotiation on paragraph 31(i), the exact
definition and scope of "set out" in the MEAs generated some debates and consen-
sus has yet to be reached. See, e.g., Submission of Australia, Proposal for an Out-
come on Trade and Environment Concerning Paragraph 31(l) of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration, TN/TE/W/72 (May 7, 2003), available at http://docsonline.
wto.org/GEN-highLightParent.asp?qu=%22set+out%22+%26+%22Paragraph+31
(i)+ofrmheoha+Ministerial%22&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FTN
%2FTE%2FW72.DOC.HTM&curdoc=5&popTitle=TN%2FTE%2FW%2F72; Sub-
mission of Malaysia, Paragraph 31(1) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, TN/TE/
W/29, (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-highLight
Parent.asp?qu=%22set+out%22+%26+%22Paragraph+3 1(i)+ofrMhetoha+Ministe
rial%22&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FTN%2FTE%2FW29.DOC.
HTM&curdoc=2 1&popTitle=TN%2FTE%2FW%2F29.
33 Demaret, supra note 3, at 59.
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tions will then be considered multilateral TREMs ("trade measures set
out in MEAs"). Most MEAs prescribe institutional arrangements in
their treaty provisions. In general, the COP, consisting of all the con-
tracting parties to the MEA, is the ultimate decision-making body
under that MEA and is responsible for matters such as adoption of
protocols and amendment, interpretation of treaty provisions, adop-
tion of soft law measures, and monitoring of implementation and com-
pliance of the MEA by parties. 4 The legal characteristics of the
decisions or resolutions adopted by the COP will depend on the treaty
provisions, practices developed through implementation, and the lan-
guage and content of the decisions or resolutions themselves. Some of
the decisions and resolutions of the COP are considered legally binding
on all parties (or parties that do not oppose such adoption)3 5 whilst
some are only considered advisory.3" The former can be regarded as
having the same legal effect as the treaty provisions and, therefore,
trade measures adopted according to such a type of COP decisions and
resolutions can be categorized as "multilateral TREMs". As for the lat-
ter, trade measures based on this type of COP decisions and resolu-
tions may not be considered "multilateral TREMs" as parties are not
legally required to implement such decisions and resolutions through
trade measures; thus, such measures cannot be regarded as "set out"
in the MEAs. In addition to the COP, there are also various types of
subsidiary bodies under different MEAs. Some of these subsidiary
bodies are tasked with providing scientific and technological advice to
the COP and the contracting parties, 37 some are responsible for pro-
viding information relating to treaty implementation,38 and some are
31 See generally Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Ar-
rangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenome-
non in International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 623, 636-47 (2004).
35 For example, amendments to the Annexes of the CITES have binding effects on
the contracting parties. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora, art. XV, Mar. 3, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085 [hereinafter
CITES] (Article XV of the CITES authorizes the COP to adopt amendments to
Annex I and Annex II).
36 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity Conference of the Parties, Access
and Benefit-Sharing as Related to Genetic Resources, COP 6 Decision VI/24 (Apr.
7-19, 2002), available at http://www.cbd.int/decisions/view.shtml?id=7198, (these
guidelines are only advisory in nature).
37 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 9,
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 31 I.L.M. 849 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994)
[hereinafter FCCC] (the "Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice"
set up under Article 9 of the FCCC is one such body).
38 See, e.g., id. at art. 10 (the "Subsidiary body for implementation" set up under
Article 10 of the FCCC is one such body).
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designed for monitoring non-compliance. 3 9 Most, if not all, of the deci-
sions made by such subsidiary bodies are either advisory or need to be
submitted for adoption by the COP, depending on the treaty provisions
or COP decisions establishing such bodies. Therefore, trade measures
adopted by an individual party based on the decisions of such subsidi-
ary bodies cannot be considered "multilateral TREMs" either.
In summary, when a dispute arises from the application of"multilateral TREMs", i.e. trade measures set out in MEAs, the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms of both the WTO and the MEA in ques-
tion should have jurisdiction over such a dispute. However, in the
situation where the issue of whether a TREM is multilateral or unilat-
eral is in question, can a dispute arising from the application of such
TREM still be submitted to the MEA? And what will be the implica-
tions of such a dispute on the question of conflicting jurisdictions? The
Chile-Swordfish dispute is a case in point.
B. The WTO Chile-Swordfish case
Swordfish is a highly migratory species whose main habitat
spans across the Pacific,40 covering the high seas and the exclusive
economic zones and territorial seas of several coastal states along the
Pacific Ocean. According to statistics of the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization and the Chilean National Fishery Agency, swordfish
stock has been steadily in decline since 1991."' Chile promulgated De-
cree 293 in 1990, prescribing a series of conservation measures with
the aim of protecting migratory species such as swordfish. The Chil-
ean Congress adopted the Fishery Law in 1991. According to Article
165 of the Fishery Law, vessels that carry fish caught in contravention
of the Chilean conservation law are not permitted to use the Chilean
ports as transship ports, nor are they allowed to dock at the Chilean
ports or to be imported into Chile, regardless of the fact that fish are
39 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone, art. 8, Sept.16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541[hereinafter the Montreal Protocol]; Fourth Meeting of the
Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone, Report of
the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer, Annex IV, UNEP/OzL.Pro.415 (Nov. 25, 1992) [hereinafter
the Fourth MOP] (The "Implementation Committee" set up under the non-compli-
ance procedures adopted by the Fourth MOP to the Montreal Protocol according to
Article 8 of that Protocol is one such body).
40 Marcos Orellana, The EU and Chile Suspend the Swordfish Case Proceedings at
the WTO and the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, ASIL INSIGHTS
(Feb. 2001), http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh60.htm (visited 20 Nov 2008).
41 Orellana, supra note 18, at 58.
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caught in international waters.4 2 As a result, EC, mainly Spanish,
fishing vessels have been prevented from transshipping and/or unload-
ing their catches of highly migratory species (such as swordfish) at the
Chilean ports since 1991." 3 This has caused great economic losses to
the EC as fishing vessels could not use the Chilean ports to transship
their catches to the final consuming countries like the United States.
Chile maintained that these measures are necessary to prevent the
depletion of fish stocks, considering the serious problem of over-fishing
of swordfish in international waters.4 4 In addition, Chile signed the
"Galapagos Accord" with Columbia and Ecuador in August 2000 that
prohibited the docking at their ports of fishing vessels that catch and
carry three highly migratory species: horse-eye jack, albacore tuna,
and swordfish.
After nearly ten years of bilateral negotiations, the EC and
Chile still could not reach any consensus to settle this dispute. The EC
thus requested for consultation with Chile under the WTO according
to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).4 5 When the consultation did not
result in the settlement of this dispute, the EC requested the estab-
lishment of a panel in November 2000, alleging that Article 165 of
Chile's Fishery Law has violated its obligations under the GATT 1994,
in particular Article V and Article XI of the GATT 1994.46 Chile, on
the other hand, informed the ITLOS and requested that the dispute
regarding conservation and sustainable exploitation of swordfish in
the South East Pacific be submitted to the special chamber of the
ITLOS in December 2000. After the good offices effort of the President
of the ITLOS, both parties agreed that this dispute should be submit-
ted to an ad hoc chamber under the ITLOS on 20 December 2000. 41
Chile alleged that the EC violated its obligation under the UNCLOS,
in particular, inter alia, Article 116 to 119 to ensure conservation of
swordfish in the fishing activities undertaken by vessels flying the flag
of any of its Member States in the high seas adjacent to Chile's exclu-
sive economic zones, Article 64 to cooperate with Chile as a coastal
state for conservation of swordfish in the high sea, and other obliga-
42 Lesley Murphy, EU and Chile reach agreement on 10-year swordfish dispute,
Int-Fish Bulletin No. 4 (2001), http://www.intfish.net/igifl/archive/ops/ifb/focus/
2001/4.htm.
43 Id.
44 Gustavo Capdevila, Chile and EU caught in dispute over swordfish, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (Dec. 12, 2000), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/sword.htm.
45 EC Swordfish Request for Consultations, supra note 16.
46 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, Chile-
Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WT/DS193/2 (Nov.
7, 2000).
47 Id.; Lowe, supra note 18, at 568.
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tions under Article 300 and Article 297.48 The EC alleged that Chile's
unilateral conservation measures violated its obligations under the
UNCLOS, in particular, inter alia, Articles 87 and 89 regarding the
freedom of the high seas, and that the "Galapagos Accord" signed by
Chile has violated Article 64 regarding the obligations to cooperate. 49
After an intense negotiation, the EC and Chile signed a provi-
sional agreement on 25 January 2001 setting out the following three
arrangements. First, both parties would re-convene the "bilateral sci-
entific and technological committee" and exchange their views on all
relevant conservation measures under this institutional framework.
Second, Chile would permit the unloading of swordfish by EC vessels
smaller than "1,000 metric tonnes" either to land them for warehous-
ing or to transship them onto other vessels in three Chilean ports.
Third, both parties would begin negotiation on conservation measures
and management in the South East Pacific.50 As a result, both parties
agreed to suspend but maintained their respective rights to re-convene
the proceedings under both the WTO and the ITLOS.5"
In this dispute, the TREM adopted by Chile became the subject
of two international tribunals (the WTO and the ITLOS) and seemed
to have "substantialised" the "potential" conflict of jurisdictions in a
dispute arising from the applications of TREMs. This dispute has mo-
mentarily been suspended by consensus through negotiations of the
disputing countries. Should such consensus fall through, how would
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the ITLOS deal with
this dispute? Are there any rules relating to conflict of jurisdictions
applicable to this type of dispute?
III. CONFLICT OF JURISDICTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS
As was mentioned in the Introduction, the problems of conflict-
ing jurisdictions5 2 in disputes arising from the applications of TREMs
48 Lowe, supra note 18, at 568.
49 EC Swordfish Request for Consultations, supra note 16; Orellana, supra note
40.
50 Arrangement between the European Communities and Chile, Chile-Measures
Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, WT/DS193/3 (Apr. 6, 2001).
51 Murphy, supra note 42; Vaughan Lowe & Robin Churchill, The International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Survey for 2001, 17 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L.
463, 466-67 (2002).
52 Terms such as "competing procedures", "competing jurisdictions", "conflicting
jurisdictions", and "overlapping jurisdictions" etc. have been used by different
scholars, and definitions of such terms vary. See, e.g., SHANY, supra note 15, at
21-28. (As the precise jurisdictional legal issues involving such phenomenon are
not the subject of this research, this article will use the term "conflicting jurisdic-
tions" and refer to the situation where the same subject matter involving the same
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partly resulted from the proliferation of international tribunals, all of
which can legally claim jurisdiction over such disputes. Apart from
the Chile-Swordfish dispute, all of the disputes involving the applica-
tions of TREMs have been resolved under the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO. There exist, however, other international
tribunals parallel to that of the WTO that are competent to hear such
disputes. The resulting complications on conflicting jurisdictions are
the central research issue in this article. This Section will briefly in-
troduce the phenomenon of the proliferation of international tribunals,
including the background to this phenomenon and the positive and
negative implications of it. The dispute settlement mechanisms of the
WTO and of the MEAs will then be presented. A detailed analysis on
relevant legal issues concerning conflicting jurisdictions, such as
whether legal principles exist to deal with such issues and, if there is
no such principle, what are the most appropriate approaches to deal
with such conflict, will be conducted in the end.
A. Proliferation of International Tribunals
It was not until the early twentieth century that states set up
permanent or semi-permanent dispute settlement mechanisms to deal
with disputes arising between and/or amongst states. 53 Compared to
only six to seven permanent international tribunals, more than ten in-
ternational or regional judicial bodies5 4 were established after 1989.5 1
Some of these international tribunals deal with disputes concerning
disputing parties is subject to different international tribunals simultaneously or
subsequently).
53 Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the
Armor, 40 COL. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 143, 143 (2001).
54 See generally Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal Sys-
tem of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
POL. 697 (1999); Romano, supra note 15, at 713-14 (In various literature on inter-
national dispute settlement mechanisms, terms such as "international courts and
tribunals" or "international judicial bodies" have been used. The term "dispute
settlement mechanisms" has not been used as often as these two terms. There has
not been a uniform definition of the term "international judicial body" or any other
similar terms. Romano put forward that only by meeting certain qualifications
can a body be referred to as an "international judicial body". These qualifications
include that a body must be a permanent one, be established by international legal
documents, rely on international laws as its source of law to resolve disputes,
abide by a set of procedural rules in its proceeding, and render legally binding
decisions upon disputing parties. As these definitional issues are not directly rele-
vant to the central theme of this article, general terms such as international tribu-
nals, dispute settlement mechanisms or dispute resolution mechanisms will be
used interchangeably in this Section).
55 Romano, supra note 15, at 709-10; see also Cesare P.R. Romano, The Interna-
tional Judiciary in Context, THE PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBU-
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international laws, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Some of them deal with disputes involving specialized areas of inter-
national laws, such as the International Criminal Court, the European
Court of Human Rights, the DSB of the WTO, and the ITLOS of the
UNCLOS. According to "The Project on International Courts and
Tribunals", 6 there are forty-three different international judicial bod-
ies currently in existence.5 7
Why is there a proliferation of international tribunals? As in-
ternational law increasingly develops and expands to domains that
once were either solely within states' domestic jurisdiction (e.g. crimi-
nal justice), or were not the object of multilateral discipline (e.g. inter-
national trade in services), or were simply vacua legis (e.g. natural
resources of the high seas or common heritage of mankind), norms of
international law, as well as the setting up of international tribunals,
increase. States begin to establish and entrust specialized interna-
tional institutions to prescribe regulations and standards, resulting in
the need to interpret such regulations and standards and to ensure
that these regulations are implemented." In other words, the more
complicated the legal order becomes, the more specialized types of
tribunals are necessary to deal with the increasingly diversified and
technical regulations.5 9 In particular, the ICJ and other pre-existing
tribunals and courts might not be able to address many types of dis-
putes involving these complicated issues.6 0 Romano provides the fol-
lowing reasons to explain the proliferation of international tribunals.
First, the end of bi-polarism and the advent of multilateralism facili-
tate the development of a new international legal order that is based
on cooperation. Second, the abandonment of Marxist-Leninist inter-
pretations of international relations has rendered the ex-socialist
states that prefer a more diplomatic approach to settling international
disputes increasingly willing to accept these international tribunals
NALS (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter Romano, International Judiciary], www.pict-pcti.
org/publications/synopticchart/synop-c4.pdf.
56 "The Project on International Courts and Tribunals" (PICT), funded by several
U.S. and European foundations, was jointly established by the "Centre on Interna-
tional Cooperation (CIC) of the New York University and the "Foundation of Inter-
national Environmental Law and Development" (FIELD) in London beginning in
1997. Since 2002, the PICT became a joint undertaking by the CIC and the "Cen-
tre for International Courts and Tribunals" of the University College London. The
Project on International Courts and Tribunals, http://www.pict-pcti.org/index.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
57 See Romano, International Judiciary, supra note 55.
58 Romano, supra note 15, at 728-29.
59 Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification Some Concluding Remarks, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 919, 926 (1999).
60 SHANY, supra note 15, at 4.
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that are more judicially oriented. Third, and most importantly, the
fact that capitalism, market-based economies and free-trade doctrines
have remained the only plausible way to viable economic development,
coupled by the explosions of FTAs, has enabled the states to become
more intertwined economically, resulting in a more urgent quest for a
more appropriate legal framework of protection and, hence the need to
establish dispute settlement mechanisms. 6 1
The proliferation of international tribunals has had several
positive implications.6 2 First, the mere phenomenon of proliferation of
international tribunals can be seen as evidence of an increased willing-
ness on the part of states to settle their disputes peacefully through
subjecting their behavior to the rule of international law. Second, the
establishment and use of international tribunals to decide questions of
international law means that more international issues are being re-
solved pursuant to international law. Third, decisions rendered by
these international tribunals help to advance the norms of interna-
tional law. Fourth, as the ICJ is limited in scope and function, the
expanded number of international tribunals can serve to fill the gaps
in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. Fifth, the establishment of new juris-
dictions and systems of control improves efficiency by helping in the
implementation of obligations and by generating a more refined and
precise system of interpretation of norms. Sixth, the increase of inter-
national tribunals with stronger enforcement power can be seen as a
decisive step in the evolution of the international legal system as it
develops a real judicial function.
However, the proliferation of international tribunals also has
negative implications. First, it poses the danger of creating the illu-
sion of completely autonomous sub-systems, each equipped with its
own judicial or controlling system. These sub-systems operate as if
they are independent from the general international legal order, which
would no longer be needed to apply the basic principles.63 Second,
these various international tribunals were formed to serve the inter-
ests of the states that established them within the treaty regime for
which they were created. The allegiance to that treaty regime may
become greater than the allegiance to the international legal system as
a whole. These specialized tribunals present the risk that their own
centrifugal forces will drive them in directions away from the core of
international law. As a result, these specialized tribunals could de-
61 See Romano, supra note 15, at 729-38.
62 See Charney, supra note 54, at 704; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Frag-
mentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International
Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791, 795-796 (1999); Spelliscy, supra
note 53, at 150-52.
63 Dupuy, supra note 62, at 796.
2009] TRADE-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES 367
velop greater variations in their determinations of general interna-
tional law and damage the coherence of the international legal
system.6 4 Third, scholars pointed out that the most worrying implica-
tion of the proliferation of international tribunals will be a situation
where one dispute is subject to multiple international tribunals simul-
taneously or subsequently.6 5 Fourth, when states can "forum shop" for
an international dispute, a relevant implication is the potential in-
crease of disagreements between or amongst international institutions
competing for jurisdictions and legal norms,6 6 which might become an
excuse for states to delay or avoid the scrutiny of international tribu-
nals. Fifth, some scholars pointed out that the phenomenon of the
proliferation of international tribunals itself is not a problem. What
raises the concern is that they have proliferated in an environment
without any formal relations between them.6 7 This is also the root
cause, and increases the impact of, the previous three negative impli-
cations. What is even worse is that this might undermine the legiti-
macy of international law when each tribunal can freely over-rule
decisions rendered by other tribunals. 68
The overall picture of the proliferation of international tribu-
nals is that, on the one hand, it is necessary and even inevitable when
norms of international law become more diversified, specialized, com-
plicated and technical, that more international tribunals would be set
up to deal with the increasing disputes concerning these norms. On
the other hand, the fact that states are willing to establish new dispute
settlement mechanisms has demonstrated the determination of the in-
ternational society as a whole to implement international obligations,
accept international regulations, settle international disputes by
peaceful means, and adopt a more judicial approach to international
disputes. All these can become very positive to the development of the
international legal system. However, as many scholars also pointed
out, the root cause of all the negative implications associated with the
proliferation of international tribunals is that these are parallel tribu-
nals under the international legal system and no legal principles exist
to determine which tribunal has primary or sole jurisdiction when
more than one tribunal can legally claim jurisdiction over the same
dispute. This is also the root cause of controversies concerning con-
64 See Charney, supra note 54, at 706; Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of Interna-
tional Judicial Tribunals, 44 INr'L & COMP. L. Q. 848, 861-62 (1995); Pemmaraju
Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Grow-
ing Strength of International Law or its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 929,
938 (2004).
65 See Dupuy, supra note 62, at 797-98; Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 683.
66 Kingsbury, supra note 15, at 684.
67 Dupuy, supra note 62, at 797; Spelliscy, supra note 53, at 152.
68 Spelliscy, supra note 53, at 154-55.
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flicting jurisdictions of disputes arising from the applications of
TREMs. The following two sub-sections will review the respective dis-
pute settlement mechanism of the WTO and of the MEAs, followed by
the analysis of the core question of this article: who has the primary or
sole jurisdiction of disputes concerning the application of TREMs.
B. The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism6 9 and the Mexico-Soft
Drink case
One of the biggest achievements in the Uruguay Round is the
establishment of a more "rule-based" dispute settlement mechanism.
Article 1.1 of the DSU stipulates that all disputes brought pursuant to
the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered
agreements shall apply the rules and procedures laid down in the
DSU.7 ° In addition to the administrative and institutional arrange-
ment of the DSB and some general obligations, the DSU lays down
detailed procedural regulations on each process of the dispute settle-
ment procedures, including the consultation stage, 7 the establish-
ment and operations of the panel7 2 and of the Appellate Body,7 3 and
the enforcement of the rulings and recommendations of the DSB.7 4
Article 3.2 of the DSU states that "dispute settlement system of
the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability
to the multilateral trading system" and that the "Members recognize
that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law."7 5 It further states, "Recommendations and
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements."7 6  Article 11 of the DSU
prescribes the function of the panel and requires that "a panel should
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an ob-
69 There exists a large volume of literature on the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism, including its significance, operational rules, practices, etc. This sub-
section will, thus, only briefly introduce the key provisions of the DSU and
relevant case law, in particular the Mexico-Soft Drink dispute, on the
jurisdictional aspect of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
70 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
art. 1.1, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU].
71 Id. art. 4.
72 Id. arts. 6-16.
73 Id. art. 17.
74 Id. art. 21-22.
75 Id. art. 3.2.
76 id.
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jective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements."77 From these rele-
vant provisions of the DSU, the panel and the Appellate Body are re-
quired to resort to the relevant provisions of the covered agreements to
settle disputes brought before the DSB, including disputes involving
the applications of TREMs.
Article 23.1 of the DSU further requests that WTO Members
shall only have recourse to, and abide by, the rulings and procedures of
the DSU when they seek the redress of a violation of obligations or
other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agree-
ments or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the cov-
ered agreements. 7' In the US-Section 301-301 of the Trade Act of
1974, the panel pointed out that Article 23.1 has rendered the rules
and proceedings under the DSU, the only dispute settlement mecha-
nism for WTO Members that seek to redress a violation of their rights
under the covered agreements.79 It does not permit WTO Members to
determine unilaterally whether a violation of the covered agreement
has occurred. The Panel refers to Article 23.1 as the "exclusive dispute
resolution clause".,s It seems, thus, that the WTO Members, under
this Article, have the obligation to refer to the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO for disputes concerning the application of the
covered agreements, including those involving the applications of
TREMs. This provision, however, cannot provide any solution to con-
troversies concerning conflicting jurisdictions, as will be explained
later.
On March 18, 2004, the United States requested for consulta-
tion with Mexico concerning Mexico's tax measures on soft drinks and
other beverages that use any sweetener other than cane sugar, alleg-
7 Id. art. 11.
78 Id. art. 23.1.
79 Panel Report, United States-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, T 7.60,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
80 The Panel states that Article 23 of the DSU "prescribes a general duty of a dual
nature. First, it imposes on all Members to 'have recourse to' the multilateral pro-
cess set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In
these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settle-
ment system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilat-
eral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call'exclusive dispute resolution clause', is an important new element of Members'
rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that
Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU,
have to 'abide by' the rules and procedures set out in the DSU." Id. at 7.43; see
also Panel Report, United States-Import Measures on Certain Products from the
European Communities, 6.13, WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000).
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ing violations of Article 111:2 and Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994.8 l
Mexico requested, as a preliminary matter, that the Panel should de-
cline to exercise its jurisdiction and recommend to the parties that
they submit their respective grievances to an Arbitral Panel under
Chapter 21 of the NAFTA.12 In considering Mexico's request, the
Panel first addressed whether it has the discretion to decline to exer-
cise its jurisdiction to hear and decide a case properly brought before
it. 8 The request by Mexico would imply that the Panel would have
the freedom to choose whether or not to exercise jurisdiction, and only
if a complainant did not have a legal right to have a panel decide a
case properly before it would the panel have such freedom within the
DSU framework. By referring to Article 11 of the DSU, the Panel
states that it would not be in a position to choose freely whether or not
to exercise jurisdictions, or it would be failing its duties under Article
11 of the DSU.s4 In addition, should the Panel have the freedom to
choose freely whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction, it could under-
mine the rights of the complaining Member considering that Article 23
grants this Member the right to have recourse to the rules and proce-
dures of the DSU, and this would be inconsistent with Article 3.2 and
Article 19.2 of the DSU.s 5 The Panel did mention that it "makes no
findings about whether there may be other cases where a panel's juris-
diction might be legally constrained, notwithstanding its approved
terms of reference." 6 Nevertheless, the Panel concludes that under
the DSU, it has no discretion to decide whether or not to exercise its
jurisdiction in a case properly before it." Mexico appealed the rulings
of the Panel on several grounds, including this jurisdictional aspect.
The Appellate Body states, first, that the WTO panels have certain
powers that are inherent in their adjudicative function. Notably,
panels have the right to determine whether they have jurisdiction in a
given case, as well as to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. Nev-
ertheless, the Appellate Body states that once jurisdiction has been
validly established, WTO panels would not have the authority to de-
cline to rule on the entirety of the claims that are before them in a
dispute.8 8 On this basis, the Appellate Body proceeds to examine Arti-
cles 3.2, 7.1, 7.2, 11, 19.2, and 23 of the DSU to determine the scope of
the panel's jurisdictional power and concludes that it sees no reason to
81 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Mexico-Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/4 (June 11, 2004).
82 Soft Drink Panel Report, supra note 19, 91 4.109.
83 Id. at 1 7.4.84 Id. at $1 7.5-7.8.
85 Id. at 7.9.
86 Id. at 7.10.
87 Id. at 7.18.
88 Soft Drink Appellate Body Report, supra note 19, at TT 45-46.
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disagree with the Panel's statement that a WTO panel "would seem
... not to be in a position to choose freely whether or not to exercise its
jurisdiction." 9 However, mindful of the precise scope of Mexico's ap-
peal and claim on this specific case, the Appellate Body did express
that it has no view as to whether there may be other circumstances in
which legal impediments could exist that would preclude a panel from
ruling on the merits of the claims that are before it. 9 °
Can these DSU provisions and jurisprudence concerning juris-
dictional aspects of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provide
any guidance on controversies arising from the conflicting jurisdictions
of disputes involving the applications of TREMs? Section II.D and
subsequent discussion will continue this analysis.
C. Dispute Resolution under the MEAs
Compared to the unified and binding dispute settlement mech-
anism for disputes concerning the covered agreements under the
WTO, there is no single judicial forum that deals with disputes con-
cerning international environmental law and the MEAs that are more
than 200 in number. The ICJ has jurisdiction over disputes concern-
ing international law in general and many of the provisions on dispute
resolutions in the MEAs provide recourse to the ICJ under certain cir-
cumstances. Some of the ICJ cases have played a very important role
in the early development of international environmental law by estab-
lishing customary laws or general principles of international environ-
mental law, 9 and continue to contribute to the contemporary
development of international environmental law.9 2 In addition, as a
response to the increasing international dispute involving the use of
natural resources or other environmental-related matters, the ICJ set
up an Environmental Chamber in 1993. This Chamber, however, has
never been called upon to hear cases. Furthermore, disputes involving
the applications and interpretations of the MEAs have rarely been
subject to the ICJ jurisdiction. In addition, there have always been
some controversies concerning the operations of the ICJ (e.g., very
strict conditions for obtaining jurisdictions, lengthy court proceedings).
89 Id. at 47-53.
90 Id. at 54.
91 See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (establishing that no
state shall permit the use of its territory in such a way as to cause damage to other
states); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25) (confirming that
states have the obligation to cooperate in the use and management of shared re-
sources in the high seas).
92 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8); see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
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All these factors have rendered the ICJ an unsuitable judicial forum to
deal with disputes concerning international environmental law and
the MEAs.9 3 An "International Environmental Court" has been pro-
posed by some scholars.9 4 Nevertheless, this proposal has also encoun-
tered difficulties and criticisms.9 5 Nearly all of the MEAs have put
down dispute resolution provisions in their treaties, and their main
characteristics are the flexibility they offer to choose from a variety of
dispute resolution mechanisms (such as negotiation, mediation, concil-
iation), and the often non-binding nature of these various
mechanisms.9 6
In addition to the more traditional means of dispute resolu-
tions, there has been some new development under international envi-
ronmental law in this front. As regulations provided under the treaty
become stricter and more technical, efforts to make sure that con-
tracting parties are in compliance with their treaty obligations and,
thus, to avoid a dispute, become the focus of MEAs that were con-
cluded after the 1980s. Therefore, general compliance mechanisms,
such as the submission of national implementation reports and the
setting up of review bodies, have been adopted by several MEAs with
the aim of assisting effective implementation of treaty obligations by
parties. A significant feature is the so-called "non-compliance proce-
dures" to deal with parties that are in non-compliance with their
treaty obligations. This non-compliance mechanism has become part
of the standard dispute resolution mechanisms in some of the more
recent MEAs concluded after the 1990s.
To provide a more comprehensive overview on the dispute set-
tlement mechanisms under the MEAs, this sub-section will first intro-
duce the standard, more traditional, dispute resolution provisions of
the CITES, the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
and the UNCLOS, followed by an introduction to the Non-Compliance
Procedures (NCP) to the Montreal Protocol, which is the first MEA
that set up a non-compliance mechanism.
1. Standard Dispute Resolution Clauses-Using the CITES, CBD
and UNCLOS as Examples
The dispute resolution clauses under most of the MEAs are
quite standard, usually ranging from diplomatic means to more judi-
93 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GATT, the ICJ & Trade-Envi-
ronment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1085-1106 (1994).
94 Id. at 1106, 1106 n.317.
95 See, e.g., id. at 1107-08; see generally Sean D. Murphy, Does the World Need a
New International Environmental Court?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 333
(2000).
96 Gonzalez-Calatayud & Marceau, supra note 14, at 279.
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cial-oriented means of dispute resolution methods. Most of them in-
clude negotiation and consultation, good offices, mediation,
arbitration, conciliation, and recourse to the ICJ. The MEAs that were
concluded earlier have provided simpler dispute resolution clauses, as
the case of the CITES will illustrate. The MEAs that were concluded
after the 1980s, on the other hand, provide more comprehensive dis-
pute resolution provisions that include almost all of the dispute resolu-
tion methods, as the case of the CBD will illustrate. Only a few MEAs
set down mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms, as the case of
the UNCLOS will illustrate.
In the case of the 1973 CITES, there is only one Article in the
treaty that deals with dispute resolution. Article 18.1 states that dis-
putes between two or more Parties with respect to the interpretation
or application of the provisions of the Convention "shall" be subject to
negotiation between the Parties involved in the dispute. If the dispute
cannot be settled through negotiation, Article 18.2 then provides that
the disputing parties "may", by mutual consent, submit the dispute to
arbitration, in particular that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
the Hague.9 7 Once the dispute is submitted to arbitration, the disput-
ing parties shall be bound by the arbitration decision. This is a fairly
standard dispute resolution clause in those MEAs that were concluded
earlier. In practice, rather than invoking Article 18, cases involving
parties that are suspected of not complying with the regulations of the
CITES, in particular those relating to trade regulations, are usually
dealt with by the decisions adopted by the Standing Committee or de-
cisions/resolutions adopted by the COP.9 8
The 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), compared to the CITES, provides a more "diversified" set of
dispute resolution methods in Article 27." Article 27.1, similar to Ar-
ticle 18.1 of the CITES, provides that a dispute between parties con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the Convention "shall" seek
solution through negotiation. 10 0 If the dispute cannot be settled
through negotiation, Article 27.2 prescribes that the disputing parties
97 CITES, supra note 35, art. 18.2.98 See Shih, Potential Conflict, supra note 12, at 121-24 (Taiwan was identified by
a group of NGOs as over-consuming rhino horns and thus hampering the conser-
vation measures for several endangered species of rhinos in 1992. The Standing
Committee of the CITES adopted a decision calling its contracting parties to adopt
stricter domestic measures against Taiwan, including trade prohibition, for its
failure to control illegal trade of rhino horns and tiger bones. As Taiwan is not a
contracting party to the CITES, the legality or legal effect of this decision of the
Standing Committee remained controversial).
99 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity art. 27, Jun. 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1004 [hereinafter CBD].
100 Id. art. 27.1; CITES, supra note 35, art. 18.1.
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"may" jointly seek the good offices of, or request mediation by, a third
party.'' Article 27.3 stipulates that, when ratifying, accepting, ap-
proving or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, the
contracting parties may declare in writing to the Depositary of the
treaty that for a dispute not resolved in accordance with Article 27.1 or
Article 27.2, it accepts one or both of the dispute settlement means as
compulsory: arbitration in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Part 1 of Annex II or submission to the ICJ. 10 2 Article 27.4 further
states that if the disputing parties have not accepted the same or any
procedures laid down in Article 27.3, the dispute "shall" be submitted
to conciliation in accordance with Part 2 of Annex II unless the parties
otherwise agree.' 0 3 This dispute resolution provision of the CBD
clearly represents the flexibility of the MEAs in terms of a more diver-
sified nature of dispute settlement mechanisms and can be seen in
many other MEAs as well.
The 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) is the codification of customary rules on the law of the seas
and, from this perspective, is quite different from, and is wider in
scope than, other MEAs that lay down new regulations to protect the
subject matter of their respective treaty regime.' 0 4 The UNCLOS,
however, does contain regulations on the protection and conservation
of the marine environment and its resources. 0 5 Thus, it can be con-
sidered as one MEA. There are three Sections in Part XV (Settlement
of Disputes) of the UNCLOS. 10 6 Section 1 lays down general provi-
sions on dispute settlement, mainly requiring parties to resort to
peaceful means of dispute resolution for disputes arising from the ap-
plications and interpretations of the Convention. l ° 7 Section 2, entitled
"Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions" and containing
ten provisions from Article 286 to Article 296, prescribes the circum-
stances under which the parties shall refer any dispute concerning the
interpretation and application of the Convention to one of the four
compulsory and binding dispute settlement means, including the
ITLOS, under Article 287.10 Section 2 also provides detailed procedu-
ral rules concerning the operations of its compulsory and binding dis-
101 CBD, supra note 99, art. 27.2.
102 Id. art. 27.3.
103 Id. art. 27.4.
104 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
105 Id. arts. 192-237.
106 There is a large body of literature on the dispute settlement mechanisms of the
UNCLOS. The following paragraphs will only provide a brief summary of the rele-
vant provisions of the UNCLOS on dispute resolution.
107 UNCLOS, supra note 104, arts. 279-85.
1o Id. arts. 286-97.
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pute settlement means, such as jurisdiction, provisional measures,
preliminary proceeding, the applicable law, the exhaustion of local
remedies, and the finality and binding force of the decision reached by
any of the judicial forums having jurisdiction over the dispute in
question. 109
These compulsory and binding dispute settlement provisions
are rarely seen in other MEAs. Article 286 provides that: "Subject to
Section 3, any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
this Convention shall, where no settlement has been reached by re-
course to Section 1, be submitted at the request of any party to the
dispute to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this sec-
tion."1 10 Article 287.1 prescribes four means of settling disputes con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the Convention from which
the parties shall choose when signing, ratifying, or acceding to the
Convention, or at any time thereafter: the ITLOS, set up in accordance
with Annex VI; the ICJ; an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VII; and a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accor-
dance with Annex VIII. 1 11 Decisions rendered by a court or tribunal
having jurisdiction under Section 2 shall, according to Article 296.1, be
final and complied with by the disputing parties." 2 Additionally, ac-
cording to Article 296.2, these decisions shall be binding between the
parties and in respect to that particular dispute." 3 In terms of juris-
diction, Article 288.1 stipulates "a court or tribunal referred to in Arti-
cle 287 shall have jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to
it in accordance with this Part.""' 4 Article 288.2 further provides: "A
court or tribunal referred to in Article 287 shall also have jurisdiction
over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an in-
ternational agreement related to the purposes of this Convention,
which is submitted to it in accordance with the agreement."' 15
2. Non-compliance Mechanisms
The first non-compliance mechanism was established under
the Montreal Protocol in 1992116 and similar mechanisms have since
been adopted by several other MEAs such as the Kyoto Protocol. 11 7
109 See id.
110 Id. art. 286.
"' Id. art. 287.1.112 Id. art. 296.1.
113 Id. art. 296.2.
114 Id. art. 288.1.
115 Id. art. 288.2.
116 Fourth MOP, supra note 39, annex IV.
117 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. DOC FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (Dec. 10, 1997).
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The main purpose of the non-compliance mechanism is to offer assis-
tance to contracting parties that are unable to implement their treaty
obligations by providing technical and financial assistance. In cases of
serious or repeated non-compliance, punitive measures, such as trade
restrictive measures, might also be recommended by the non-compli-
ance mechanism."' Compared to the traditional bilateral and con-
frontational dispute settlement methods aimed at settling disputes
that have already arisen, the non-compliance mechanism takes on a
more facilitative approach aimed at the avoidance of disputes arising
from non-compliance. As a result, the concept and theory regarding
compliance under international environmental law and the associated
practices of non-compliance mechanisms are quite different from the
more traditional dispute settlement mechanisms under international
law. 119 The concept of compliance and the non-compliance mecha-
nisms adopted by some MEAs have been characterized differently by
scholars under international environmental law. Birnie and Boyle re-
gard the non-compliance mechanism as one form of supervisory tech-
niques. 12 0 Sands, on the other hand, regards compliance as part of the
wider concept of dispute resolution and group implementation, en-
forcement, and dispute settlement under the concept of"compliance".12
The non-compliance mechanism was not created to deal with
disputes concerning damage caused by an act (e.g non-compliance with
treaty obligations) of one party to another party. However, the concept
of "disputes" can hardly be limited as only related to damage to a few
countries considering that the objectives and purposes of the MEAs
are to protect global resources, rather than to confer specific rights to
individual parties. Moreover, all of the previously mentioned dispute
118 See, e.g., Jacob Werksman, Compliance and Transition: Russia's Non-Compli-
ance Tests the Ozone Regime, 56(3) HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 750 (1996) (The 1995
Russia non-compliance case under the Montreal Protocol's NCP is one such exam-
ple. In this case, Russia requested for a suspension of its obligations under the
Protocol. The Implementation Committee under the NCP, however, was not satis-
fied with the response of Russia regarding its non-compliance situation, requested
further information from Russia, and made the recommendations that trade with
Russia on regulated substances should be restricted and financial assistance
should be provided from the Protocol's financial mechanism. The following MOP 7
adopted. the recommendations of the Implementation Committee through consen-
sus, under the protest of Russia, in December 1995).
119 See generally Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compliance Control in Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 377 (2002)
(providing further information on non-compliance).
120 PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT
205-09 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2002).
121 See generally SANDS, supra note 31, at 171-230.
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resolution provisions of several MEAs only refer to disputes "concern-
ing the interpretation or applications" of the conventions without re-
ferring to the consequent damage caused as the qualifying conditions.
Some scholars, thus, propose that dispute settlement mechanisms
under international environmental law play a certain public function
with an aim to preserve values and objectives common to the global
society.' 2 2 From this perspective, rather than replacing the more
traditional dispute settlement mechanisms, the non-compliance mech-
anisms provide an alternative set of procedures to settle differences
between or amongst parties regarding disputes arising from the "inter-
pretation or application" of MEAs.1 2 3 This is why the non-compliance
mechanism will be regarded in this article as within the wider concept
of dispute settlement mechanisms of the MEAs.
Take the "non-compliance procedures" (NCP) under the Mon-
treal Protocol as an example. 124 The investigation of non-compliance
can be initiated by any party that suspects the non-compliance of an-
other party, the Secretariat of the Protocol, and the party that regards
itself as in the state of non-compliance. The request for investigation
can be submitted to the Secretariat at any time and will be handed to
the "Implementation Committee" to conduct the investigation. The
Implementation Committee, consisting of ten Members selected by the
Meeting of the Parties (MOP) to the Protocol, is a permanent institu-
tion that is responsible to conduct the investigation and to review all
the documents before recommending the most appropriate solutions to
deal with an incidence of non-compliance. The recommendation of the
Implementation Committee will be submitted to the MOP, which is
responsible to adopt a final decision on this matter. Under the NCP,
the MOP is able to recommend financial and/or technical assistance to
the non-complying party with the aim to assist prompt compliance
with the Protocol. In cases of repeated or serious non-compliance, the
MOP can also adopt more punitive decisions, such as issue cautions
and suspend specific rights and privileges under the Protocol, includ-
ing those concerned with trade, transfer of technology, and financial
mechanism. 125
122 A. Neil Craik, Recalcitrant Reality and Chosen Ideals: The Public Function of
Dispute Settlement in International Environmental Law, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 551, 563 (1998).
123 Gunther Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environ-
mental Obligations, 5 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29, 46 (1997).
124 See Fourth MOP, supra note 39, annex IV; Ehrmann, supra note 119, at
395-405.
125 Fourth MOP, supra note 39, annex V.
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D. Who Has the Primary and/or Sole Jurisdiction?
Disputes arising from the application of TREMs can be submit-
ted to the dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO (such as the
Chile-Swordfish Case) and to other international tribunals as well.
For example, a dispute involving the application of TREMs that is au-
thorized by an MEA can be submitted to the WTO, to the ICJ, and also
to the dispute resolution procedures provided under the MEAs, includ-
ing conciliation, arbitration, various types of courts and tribunals, and
non-compliance procedures. Under this circumstance, this type of dis-
pute might be subject to the jurisdictions of more than one interna-
tional tribunal simultaneously or subsequently. Decisions by different
tribunals might also be rendered regarding this type of dispute. Are
there any legal principles on conflicting or multiple jurisdictions to de-
termine which tribunal has the primary or sole jurisdiction?
Legal principles on dealing with multiple jurisdictions over the
same dispute exist under private international law (conflict of laws)
and domestic law. Scholars attempt to apply such legal principles,
such as electa una via, forum non conveniens, lis alibi pendens, and res
judicata to analyze controversies concerning conflicting jurisdictions
under public international law in the era of proliferation of interna-
tional tribunals. 126 However, treaties that set up these international
tribunals have not incorporated such principles on jurisdiction in the
treaties. Neither can these principles be regarded as customary law or
general principles of law on conflicting jurisdictions amongst interna-
tional tribunals.' 2 7 It has also been suggested that general principles
of law might be able to provide some guidance to fill this legal vacuum
and that the principles of fairness and of reasonableness, two princi-
ples that apply to jurisdictional conflict of domestic courts and private
international law, might be applicable here. In addition, three legal
principles that deal with conflicting jurisdictions of domestic courts
(i.e., the principle of comity, forum non conveniens, and rules on choice
of law) might also be applicable.'12  Still other scholars provide that
the principles of good faith and abus de droit might be applicable to
deal with or prevent issues of conflicting jurisdictions over a dispute
arising from the application of TREMs between the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO and that of the MEAs. 12 9
126 Chester Brown, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1045 (2003) (reviewing SHANY, YUVAL, THE
COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003)); Lau-
rence Boisson de Chazournes, Recent Books on International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 610, 622-25 (2004); Marceau, supra note 8, at 1112.
127 Brown, supra note 126, at 1046.
128 Guruswamy, supra note 18, at 300-01, 308.
129 Gonzalez-Calatayud & Marceau, supra note 14, at 282-83.
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International tribunals are established by their respective
treaties. In other words, their jurisdictions are conferred only after
obtaining the consent of states. Therefore, previously mentioned legal
principles of private international law are legally unsuitable to be ap-
plied to jurisdictional conflicts between international tribunals under
public international law, unless they are specifically prescribed by
treaties establishing such tribunals. Additionally, there have yet to be
cases by international tribunals that apply these principles to deal
with conflicting jurisdictions. Furthermore, there is no mechanism ex-
isting under public international law which acts as a supreme court
under the domestic legal system to render a final and binding decision.
It is suggested that the ICJ might be an appropriate tribunal to play
such a role. This suggestion, however, requires an amendment to the
Statues of the ICJ, which seems unrealistic in practice. 130 To summa-
rize, for all the controversies that might arise concerning conflicting
and multiple jurisdictions between international tribunals, there are
currently no general legal principles to determine which tribunal has
the primary or sole jurisdiction on a dispute over which multiple tribu-
nals can establish jurisdictions.
As mentioned previously, international tribunals are estab-
lished by their respective treaties. Can solutions to conflicting juris-
dictions be found under the respective treaties setting up these
tribunals? For disputes arising from the application of multilateral
TREMs, a closer examination on both provisions of the DSU and the
dispute resolution provisions of the MEAs will be conducted next.
Article 23.1 of the DSU mandates that Members have recourse
to and abide by rules and procedures of the DSU when seeking to re-
dress a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of
benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attain-
ment of any objective of the covered agreements.' 31 The panel in the
US-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 refers to this Article as
the "exclusive dispute resolution clause."' 32 Can Article 23.1 provide
guidance in dealing with conflicting jurisdictions concerning disputes
involving the application of TREMs? Not necessarily. First, Article 23
cannot prevent other international tribunals from legally obtaining ju-
risdiction under their treaty provisions over a dispute involving the
application of multilateral TREMs.' 3 3 A dispute arises when the ap-
plication of TREMs by Country A affects the interests (usually trade
interests) of Country B. When both countries are members of the
WTO, Country B will naturally bring this dispute to the WTO if it
130 Dupuy, supra note 62, at 800.
131 DSU, supra note 70, art. 23.1.
132 Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 79, 7.43.
133 Marceau, supra note 8, at 1111.
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thinks that the TREMs adopted by Country A have violated the cov-
ered agreements or have nullified or impaired the benefits under the
covered agreements. The function of Article 23 of the DSU is to pre-
vent Country B from dealing with such a dispute unilaterally. 134 How-
ever, situations involving conflicting jurisdictions usually result from
disputes similar to the Chile-Swordfish case, where the disputing par-
ties each bring their respective complaints to different tribunals, re-
sulting in a situation where more than one tribunal will be hearing
and deciding the legality of the same TREM according to different le-
gal regimes. This is what Article 23 of the DSU is not set out to
handle.
Take the above-mentioned dispute between Country A and
Country B as an example and assume that both countries are con-
tracting parties to an MEA that has its own compulsory dispute settle-
ment mechanism. If the dispute has yet to be subjected to any
tribunal and Country A alleges that, for a dispute involving the appli-
cation of TREM adopted under the authorization of that particular
MEA, Country B is prevented from having recourse to the dispute set-
tlement mechanism of the WTO and is obliged to use the dispute set-
tlement mechanism under the MEA, then Article 23 of the DSU will be
inapplicable under this circumstance as Country A does not assert a
violation of its rights under the WTO. If the dispute has already been
brought to the WTO dispute settlement proceeding by Country B and
Country A claims that the WTO does not have jurisdiction over this
dispute, Article 23 of the DSU is also inapplicable to solve this conflict-
ing jurisdictional issue. On the contrary, Article 23 and other provi-
sions of the DSU serve to confirm that the WTO panel cannot choose to
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction, as established by the Mexico-
Soft Drink case.
From the findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body in the
Mexico-Soft Drink case, it seems that once a case is brought before it
and the jurisdiction has been validly established, the WTO panels
would not have the discretion to choose freely whether or not to exer-
cise its jurisdiction. 135 However, as the factual background of the
Mexico-Soft Drink case is different from the Chile-Swordfish dispute,
and the dispute had not yet been submitted to other dispute settle-
ment proceedings, it would be difficult to predict with certainty
whether the WTO panel in a dispute similar to the Chile-Swordfish
case would adopt the position in the Mexico-Soft Drink case. 13 6 It is
134 See DSU, supra note 70, art. 23.
... See generally Soft Drink Panel Report, supra note 19; Soft Drink Appellate
Body Report, supra note 19.
136 Soft Drink Panel Report, supra note 19, 4.201 (In the Mexico-Soft Drink
case, Mexico alleged that its tax regime on soft drinks was adopted as a means to
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also necessary to keep in mind that both the panel and the Appellate
Body in the Mexico-Soft Drink case expressed the view that this juris-
dictional issue is not yet conclusive as they express no view whether
there may be other circumstances in which legal impediments could
exist that would preclude a panel from ruling on the merits of the
claims that are before it. Whether the existence of an ongoing dispute
settlement proceeding in a particular MEA concerning the same dis-
pute constitutes other circumstances in which legal impediments exist
for the WTO panel to decline exercising jurisdiction is yet to be
determined.
In comparison to the analysis that only focused on the DSU,
examinations will need to be focused on the dispute resolution provi-
sions of every single MEA to determine whether that particular MEA
has laid down provisions to deal with the issues of conflicting jurisdic-
tions. From the descriptions in Section II.C, it is noted that most
MEAs provide a variety of means for the parties to choose from for
settling a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of a
treaty, without providing any relevant provision on jurisdictional is-
sues. Relevant provisions are also not laid down in the non-compli-
ance mechanism adopted by some MEAs.
UNCLOS prescribes a compulsory dispute settlement mecha-
nism that is probably the only exception and contains two provisions to
deal with jurisdictional issues, Article 281 and 282. Article 281.1 pro-
vides that:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute con-
cerning the interpretation or application of this Conven-
tion have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures pro-
vided for in this Part apply only where no settlement has
been reached by recourse to such means and the agree-
ment between the parties does not exclude any further
procedure. 13 7
Article 282 further states:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute con-
cerning the interpretation or application of this Conven-
tion have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral
agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the
request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to a
procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure
shall apply in lieu of the procedures provided for in this
force the U.S. to implement U.S. obligations under NAFTA to open its market for
sugar imports from Mexico. Because of this, Mexico alleged that this dispute
should be submitted to an Arbitral Panel under Chapter 21 of NAFTA).
137 UNCLOS, supra note 104, art. 281.
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Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise
agree.138
Article 281 basically defers to the choice of dispute settlement forum
selected by consensus of the disputing parties and, thus, does not pro-
vide guidance to deal with issues of conflicting jurisdictions. Article
282, on the other hand, seems to deal specifically with situations
where multiple jurisdictions exist over a dispute concerning the inter-
pretation and application of the UNCLOS.
There have been three disputes involving multiple jurisdictions
and the application of Article 282 under the ITLOS: the Southern
Bluefin Tuna case in 1999-2000,' the Swordfish case in 2000,'4°  and
the MOX Plant case in 2001.141 Apart from the Swordfish case that
has been suspended per the consensus of the disputing parties, the
ITLOS has applied and interpreted Article 282 in the other two
cases.' 4 2 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, the ITLOS noted that
Article 282 only applies to a situation where the general, regional or
bilateral agreement specifically prescribes that dispute settlement
procedures and decisions rendered under those procedures are compul-
sory and only under this circumstance can the jurisdiction of the
ITLOS be excluded. 4 3 In the MOX Plant case, the UK relied on Arti-
cle 282 to claim that the dispute should be subject to the compulsory
dispute settlement mechanism under the "Ospar Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of North-East Atlantic"' 4 4 and/
or the European Atomic Energy Treaty.' 4 5 This claim, however, was
rejected by the ITLOC because the dispute settlement mechanisms
under these two treaties are responsible to deal with disputes concern-
ing the interpretation and application of these two treaties, not of the
UNCLOS.' 4 6 In addition, even when rights and obligations under
these two treaties are "similar to or identical with the rights or obliga-
tions set out in the LOS Convention, the rights and obligations under
those agreements have a separate existence from those under the Con-
138 Id. art. 282.
139 Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (New Zealand v. Japan and Australia v. Japan),
119 I.L.M. 508 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2000) [hereinafter Southern Bluefin Tuna].
140 Swordfish Case, supra note 17.
141 MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. UK), 126 I.L.M. 260 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001)
[hereinafter MOX].
142 See Robin Churchill and Joanne Scott, The MOX Plant Litigation: The first
half-life, 53 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 643, 653-57 (2004).
143 See generally Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 139.
144 Ospar Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic, Sep. 22, 1992, available at http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/
ospar/html/OSPARConvention-e-updated-text2007.pdf.
145 MOX, supra note 141, TT 49-50.
146 Id.
2009] TRADE-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES 383
vention." 4 ' From these two cases, it seems quite difficult in practice
to exclude the jurisdiction of the ITLOS (or any other means of dispute
settlement under Part XV) under Article 282 as it is nearly impossible
to find one international agreement providing the same rights and ob-
ligations as those of the UNCLOS and a set of compulsory dispute set-
tlement mechanisms as well.
From the above analysis of respective dispute resolution provi-
sions of the WTO and of the UNCLOS, it seems that solutions are not
provided under the respective treaty provisions to deal with issues of
conflicting jurisdictions either. To summarize, no general legal princi-
ples exist to deal with issues of conflicting jurisdictions of interna-
tional tribunals and, on the other hand, provisions to deal with such
jurisdictional issues rarely exist in either the DSU or the dispute reso-
lution provisions of the MEAs. It seems that such controversies con-
cerning conflicting jurisdictions cannot be resolved effectively.' 4 S
Several proposals have been put forward to deal with such con-
troversies. First, it has been suggested that the ICJ can play a crucial
role under such circumstances. 149 For example, the disputing parties
or individual international tribunals involved under this circumstance
can seek assistance from the ICJ by requesting an advisory opinion
from the ICJ to clarify jurisdictional conflict between treaties or inter-
national institutions. 50 Alternately, the ICJ can be transformed into
an appeal or supreme court to provide a final decision regarding juris-
dictional conflict. However, as previously mentioned, these proposals
all involve an amendment to the Statute of the ICJ, which would be
rather difficult to pass. Second, it has been suggested that communi-
cations and exchange of views between international tribunals could
be enhanced to reach an overall consensus of the international legal
order, so that practices can be established where, under the discretion
of their constituent treaties, each tribunal will give deference to rules
and proceedings of other tribunals concerning legal issues that should
be under the jurisdictions of those tribunals."'5 This echoes the princi-
ple of comity proposed by some scholars.' 5 2 In the MOX Plant case, for
instance, the arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII of the UN-
CLOS suspended the proceeding of the case for five months and waited
147 Id.
148 See Marceau, supra note 8, at 1130-31.
149 See Dupuy, supra note 62, at 798-801.
150 Lorand Bartels, Book review, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 519 (2004) (reviewing
LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, CESRE ROMANO AND RUTH MACKENZIE, INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND
PROSPECTS (2004)).
151 Dupuy, supra note 62, at 802.
152 See generally SHANY, supra note 15; Guruswamy, supra note 18, at 322.
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for the more suitable tribunal, the European Court of Justice, to make
the decision on the jurisdictional issue. 15 3
Some of the above-mentioned proposals are unrealistic in prac-
tice, while some might require tribunals to exercise a great sense of
self restraint. Furthermore, some tribunals might even be legally pre-
vented from refusing to exercise jurisdiction under certain circum-
stances, as the Mexico-Soft Drink case demonstrated. In other words,
none of these proposals seem to offer a satisfactory solution to deal
with controversies concerning conflicting jurisdictions resulting from a
legal vacuum where no legal principles exist to solve such controver-
sies. Under the circumstances, what are the implications of disputes
arising from the application of TREMs, or in particular, multilateral
TREMs?
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICTING JURISDICTIONS
ON DISPUTE ARISING FROM THE APPLICATION OF
TREMS
It has already been noted in Section I that the potential conflict
in jurisdictions concerning disputes involving the application of
TREMs has been substantialized in the Chile-Swordfish case. It has,
furthermore, been demonstrated in Section II that neither legal princi-
ples in general nor specific provisions under the DSU and MEAs exist
that offer satisfactory solutions to deal with controversies concerning
conflicting jurisdictions. Does this mean that the proliferation of inter-
national tribunals will inevitably produce the negative consequences
mentioned in Section II.A where jurisdictions such as the WTO and
MEAs conflict as how to apply TREMs?
This Section will first hypothesize several possible scenarios
should the Chile-Swordfish case have not been suspended and both the
ITLOS and WTO panel had the dispute before them. Second, three
hypothetical cases of conflicting jurisdictions involving the application
of multilateral TREMs will be constructed to analyze the possibility of
such conflicts and the consequent implications to the applications of
TREMs.
A. Hypothetical Scenarios of the Chile-Swordfish Case
Assuming that the EC and Chile did not reach any consensus
on settling their dispute concerning the Chilean measure in question
153 MOX Plant Arbitration (Ireland v.s. UK), Order No. 4, Further Suspension of
Proceedings on Jurisdiction and Merits, Nov. 14, 2003, Arbitral Tribunal consti-
tuted under Art 287 and Annex 1, Art 1 of UNCLOS, cited in: Lorand Bartels, The
Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to avoid judicial activism, 53 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 861 (2004), at note 141 and accompanying text available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?filid=73.
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and the WTO panel and the ITLOS ad hoc chamber both began their
respective dispute settlement proceedings, will the worst scenario hap-
pen wherein one dispute subject to multiple tribunals that has serious
negative impact on the international legal order? The possible legal
claims and defenses put forward by the EC and Chile in the WTO
panel proceeding and in the ITLOS proceeding might be as follows.
In the WTO panel proceeding, the EC alleged that the Chilean
measures violate Article V, Article XI of the GATT 1994'11 and Chile
could use the general exception provided by Article XX(b) and (g) as its
possible defense.' 5 5 Chile could also put forward the argument that its
measures are adopted to comply with the UNCLOS or other conserva-
tion-related MEAs, although whether the Chilean measures in ques-
tion can be regarded as those set out in the UNCLOS is still unclear.
Under the circumstances, the Panel and/or the Appellate Body (should
the dispute be appealed) would, according to Articles 3.2 and 11 of the
DSU (and their respective terms of reference), 15 6 examine the con-
formity of the Chilean measures in dispute with the GATT/WTO. On
the other hand, Chile would allege that the EC has violated the obliga-
tions of cooperation and conservation under the UNCLOS, while the
EC would claim that it did not violate the UNLCOS and that it was
Chile that violated the obligations of cooperation and the freedom of
the high seas. Under the circumstances, the ITLOS would need to re-
view the action (or non-action) of the EC, according to Chile's claim, to
determine whether the EC has violated the UNCLOS and then review
the Chilean measures, including the signing of Galapagos Accord, ac-
cording to the EC's claim to determine whether Chile has violated the
UNCLOS. In the first part of the ITLOS review, the TREMs adopted
by Chile are not subject to review by the ITLOS and are only subject to
review by the WTO panel and/or the Appellate Body. In the second
part of the ITLOS review, the TREMs adopted by Chile are subject to
review by the ITLOS as well as by the WTO panel and/or the Appellate
Body.
In the first part of the ITLOS review, the disputing TREMs,
that is, the Chilean measures banning the unloading and importation
of fish that are caught in contravention of Chile's conservation law, are
not examined by two different tribunals, and thus no conflicting juris-
dictions exist. In the second part of the ITLOS review, two different
tribunals, both of which have legitimate jurisdiction to hear the dis-
pute, would examine the legality of the disputing TREMs. In other
words, the WTO panel and the ITLOS would determine, respectively,
the consistency of the Chilean measures with GATT Article V and Ar-
154 See Swordfish Case, supra note 17.
155 Id.
156 DSU, supra note 70,
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ticle XI, as well as with the UNCLOS Article 87 and Article 89. From
the previous analysis in Section II.D, neither the dispute settlement
mechanism of the WTO nor that of the UNCLOS has the primary and/
or sole jurisdiction here, and a decision rendered by one tribunal would
not affect the proceedings or decisions of the other tribunal.1 5 Will
this result in the fragmentation and inconsistency of the international
legal order as a whole?
Not necessarily. The WTO panel is required, under Articles 3.2
and 11 of the DSU as well as its terms of reference, 158 to apply the
relevant provisions of the GATT/WTO to examine the Chilean mea-
sures, while the ITLOS, under Article 293.1 of the UNCLOS,' 5 9 is re-
quired to apply the UNCLOS and other relevant rules of international
law not incompatible with the UNCLOS. Under any circumstances, a
single act might trigger several types of legal consequences as pro-
vided under different legal requirements. For example, an act of mur-
der could be subject to both a civil liability proceeding of torts and a
criminal investigation of homicide. The TREMs themselves exhibit
dual characteristics of trade measures and environmental objectives.
As the WTO panel and the ITLOS would apply their respective special-
ized rules to examine the legality of the same Chilean TREMs, and in
the process offer their respective interpretations of their specialized
rules, other international principles of general applicability are not
likely to be affected. As a result, the fragmentation and inconsistency
of the international legal order as a whole might not arise under the
circumstances. As evidenced by the above discussion, scholars who
worry about the negative implications of conflicting jurisdictions
mainly express concern that rulings from different international tribu-
nals might interpret and apply legal principles of general applicability
differently, resulting in inconsistency and fragmentation of general in-
ternational law. However, as each of these specialized tribunals are
required to adjudicate and decide the case according to its own special-
ized rules, legal principles of general applicability might not even be
applied and interpreted by these specialized tribunals. In fact, accord-
ing to some scholars, multiple proceedings relating to the same facts
but involving distinct legal claims under international law might not
be regarded as "same issues," one of the two prominent features of
competing jurisdictions, and hence might not even be characterized as
"conflicting or competing jurisdictions."' 60
157 Namely, the decision rendered by the ITLOS confirming the conformity of the
Chilean measures with the UNCLOS will not affect how the WTO panel examines
the same Chilean measures under its proceeding to determine the consistency of
the Chilean measures with the GATIT/WTO.
158 DSU, supra note 70, arts. 3.2, 11.
159 UNCLOS, supra note 104, art. 293.1.
16o SHANY, supra note 15, at 26.
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Nevertheless, there are negative implications for the states in
dispute, as the following discussion will illustrate. In the second part
of the ITLOS review, where the same Chilean TREMs are subject to
review by both the WTO panel and the ITLOS, four possible outcomes
might take place, as demonstrated in Table 1:
TABLE 1: POSSIBLE SCENARIO UNDER THE CHILE-
SWORDFISH CASE
WTO finds the Chilean WTO finds the Chilean
TREMs inconsistent TREMs consistent with
with the GATT/WTO the GATT/WTO
ITLOS finds the Situation A Situation B
Chilean TREMs
inconsistent with the
UNCLOS
ITLOC finds the Situation C Situation D
Chilean TREMs
consistent with the
UNCLOS
For Chile, there are no difficulties under Situations A and D.
In Situation D, the Chilean TREMs can be legally maintained and
under Situation A, the Chilean government is also likely to withdraw
the TREMs in dispute without encountering any difficulties. However,
in Situations B and C, what should the Chilean government do?
Under Situation B, the WTO panel rules in favor of Chile and
finds the Chilean TREMs consistent with the GATT/WTO while the
ITLOS rules in favor of the EC and finds the Chilean TREMs inconsis-
tent with the UNCLOS. What action can the Chilean government
take? Should the Chilean government maintain or withdraw its
TREMs in dispute? When the WTO panel rules that the Chilean mea-
sures are in conformity with the GATT/WTO, the Chilean government
is not legally required to maintain these TREMs, and if it decides to
implement the rulings of the ITLOS and withdraw or revise the
TREMs in question, it will not affect its WTO obligations. In this situ-
ation, advocates of TREMs can hardly blame the Chilean government
for failing to conserve swordfish, as it is the ITLOS that finds the Chil-
ean TREMs illegal. Furthermore, considering that the enforcement
mechanism under the UNCLOS is not as effective as that of the DSU,
Chile could take the chance of choosing to maintain its conservation
measures should it calculate that the odds of counteractions from the
EC are minimal.
Under Situation C, the WTO panel rules in favor of the EC and
Chile is required to withdraw its TREMs while the ITLOS rules in
favor of Chile and Chile can legally maintain the TREMs. What action
can the Chilean government take? Should the Chilean government
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maintain or withdraw its TREMs in dispute? When the EC lost its
case under the ITLOS, Chile can legally maintain its TREMs under
the UNCLOS regime. This, however, does not mean that Chile has an
obligation to do so, particularly when the TREMs in dispute are not
specifically required by any provision of the UNCLOS. In other words,
Chile will not violate its obligations under the UNCLOS if its govern-
ment decides to implement the rulings and recommendations of the
DSB and withdraw the TREMs in question. On the other hand, if
Chile decides to maintain the TREMs, it might face possible trade re-
taliation from the EC under the authorization of the DSB. Under this
circumstance, the Chilean government is quite likely to withdraw or
revise its TREMs in question so that it can implement the rulings and
recommendation of the DSB and is not in violation of its obligations
under the UNCLOS.1 6 ' This decision might seem disturbing to advo-
cates of TREMs and, to some extent, the Chilean government, as Chile
is forced to withdraw legitimate TREMs under the UNCLOS to fulfill
the requirements of Chile's obligation under the WTO.
For states that use TREMs as an environmental protection
tool, this seems quite a negative implication resulting from the inabil-
ity to resolve conflicting jurisdictions involving the applications of
TREMs. This, however, does not entirely result from the unresolved
issues concerning conflicting jurisdictions. Recalling from the Intro-
duction that the legal debates on the TREMs can be categorized into
two groups, one concerning the conflict of norms and the other con-
cerning the conflicts of jurisdictions, the inability to come up with a
satisfactory solution to the issues of conflict of substantive norms be-
tween the GATT/WTO and the MEAs also contributes to generate this
negative implication. If substantive legal rules under both the GATT/
WTO and the UNCLOS (or other MEAs), or even general legal princi-
ples can provide guidance to deal with potential conflicting norms, this
negative implication might be prevented, even in the face of un-
resolved issues of conflicting jurisdictions, as the chances of Situation
B and Situation C might be prevented.1 6 2
B. Disputes arising from the Application of TREMs
The Chile-Swordfish dispute involves only two states, one that
adopts the TREMs and the other affected by the TREMs. The applica-
tion of a genuine multilateral TREM might not only generate contro-
161 However, if the TREMs in question are specifically authorized by the UNCLOS
in its treaty provisions, the decision to implement the ruling and recommendation
of the DSB will render Chile in violation of its obligations under the UNCLOS,
which will be discussed in more detail in the following subsection.
162 For example, multilateral TREMs meeting certain requirements would be pre-
sumed legitimate under the GATT7WTO.
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versies of conflicting jurisdictions but also involve more than two
states. What will be the implications of this? This subsection will de-
sign three hypothetical cases to provide further analysis.
In Case 1, Country A and Country B are both WTO Members
and parties to the Montreal Protocol. According to the phase-out
schedule for controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol, Coun-
try A prohibits the importation of all types of cooling equipment con-
taining CFCs from all countries, including Country B, while Country B
does not impose the same import prohibition. Country B challenged
this trade prohibition measure adopted by Country A to the WTO. At
the same time, Country A brought Country B to the dispute resolution
mechanism under the Montreal Protocol for Country B's failure to im-
plement the phase-out schedules by prohibiting trade of such products.
Under the Montreal Protocol, Country A can resort to the dispute reso-
lution clauses under the Montreal Protocol, which resembles the tradi-
tional and typical dispute resolution clauses of most of the MEAs, as
introduced in Section II.C, which include an arbitral tribunal, the ICJ,
or a conciliation committee.
In addition, Country A can also initiate the non-compliance
procedures of the Protocol and request the Implementation Committee
to investigate whether Country B is not complying with its obligations
under the Protocol. In this case, the WTO panel and/or the Appellate
Body will examine the consistency of trade prohibition measures
adopted by Country A, a genuine multilateral TREM, with relevant
provisions of the GATT/WTO. The dispute settlement forum under the
Montreal Protocol, be it an arbitral tribunal, the ICJ, the conciliation
committee, or the Implementation Committee, will examine the ac-
tions, or inactions, of Country B as alleged by Country A. Under these
circumstances, the subject matter under each respective tribunal is
different and, thus, does not result in controversies concerning con-
flicting jurisdictions. However, should Country A's TREM be found in-
consistent with the GATT/WTO and withdrawal is necessary to avoid
trade retaliation authorized by the DSB from Country B, this might
put Country A in a difficult situation where the implementation of one
set of rules (rulings and recommendations of the DSB) inevitably re-
sults in the non-compliance with another set of rules (the Montreal
Protocol).
Meanwhile, should the Implementation Committee under the
Montreal Protocol make a recommendation, which is later adopted by
the MOP, that Country B will be prevented from trading with other
parties if it does not comply with its obligations (i.e. the import prohi-
bition measures) under the Protocol, this might also put Country B in
the same place as Country A. As similar trade measures adopted by
Country A have already been found inconsistent with the GATT/WTO,
Country B might face challenges from other WTO members that are
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affected by such import prohibition measures. This also puts Country
B in an awkward position where the implementation of one set of rules
(decisions of the COP to the Montreal Protocol) might later result in
legal challenges, even in trade retaliation from another set of rules
(potential rulings and recommendations from the DSB). These two
complexities, nevertheless, do not result from controversies concerning
conflicting jurisdictions but from controversies concerning conflicting
norms.
In Case 2, Countries C and D are both WTO members and
Country C is a party to the Montreal Protocol. Country C, in accor-
dance with Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, prohibits the importa-
tion of cooling equipment containing CFCs from non-parties to the
Montreal Protocol, including Country D. Country D challenges the
trade prohibition measure adopted by Country C to the WTO. The
WTO panel and/or the Appellate Body will examine the consistency of
Country C's trade prohibition measure, a genuine multilateral TREM,
with relevant provisions of the GATT/WTO. As only Country C is a
party to the Montreal Protocol, the dispute settlement mechanisms
under the Montreal Protocol will not have jurisdiction over any dispute
arising between Country C and Country D. In addition to the dispute
settlement mechanism of the WTO, can this dispute be settled in an-
other international tribunal? For example, can Country C or Country
D bring this dispute to the ICJ? For Country D, alleging that the
TREM in question violated the GATT/WTO, it is required under Arti-
cle 23 of the DSU to have recourse to and abide by the rules and proce-
dures of the DSU, and, thus is prevented from resorting to the ICJ
concerning seeking redress of a violation of obligations of the GATT/
WTO. For Country C, it might be quite difficult to allege that Country
D's continued use of cooling equipment containing CFCs is a violation
of customary international law or causes damages to Country C.
Therefore, Country C might also be prevented from having recourse to
the ICJ. Most importantly, it must be determined whether the ICJ
has obtained the jurisdiction through mutual consensus of both parties
or other means as laid down in its statutes.
In this case, it is very likely that there will only be one tribu-
nal, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, for the dispute involving
the multilateral TREM adopted by Country C and no controversies
concerning conflicting jurisdictions will arise. Note, however, that con-
troversies concerning conflicting norms might still arise under this
case. If the WTO panel/Appellate Body finds that this multilateral
TREM adopted by Country C in accordance with the Montreal Protocol
is inconsistent with the GATT/WTO and requests the revision or with-
drawal of the TREM, Country C might face a serious dilemma. If it
implements the rulings and recommendations of the DSB and with-
draws its TREM, it is in violation of its obligations under the Montreal
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Protocol and might face investigations of non-compliance from the
Montreal Protocol. If it decides to continue the trade prohibition mea-
sure to comply with the Montreal Protocol, it faces possible trade retal-
iation from Country D as authorized by the DSB. This, however, does
not result from controversies concerning conflicting jurisdictions.
In Case 3, Countries E, F, and G are all WTO Members and
Country E and F are parties to the Montreal Protocol. Country E, ac-
cording to Article 4 of the Protocol, prohibits the import of all cooling
equipment containing CFCs from non-parties, including those from
Country G. At the same time, however, Country E does not prohibit
the importation of refrigerators containing CFCs from non-parties, in-
cluding those from Country G. Country G brought the dispute to the
WTO alleging that the TREMs adopted by Country E prohibiting the
import of cooling equipment containing CFCs are inconsistent with the
GATT/WTO. Meanwhile, Country F can either initiate the non-com-
pliance procedures, or resort to the traditional dispute resolution
clauses under the Protocol, alleging that Country E is in non-compli-
ance with the Protocol because it does not prohibit the import of refrig-
erators containing CFCs. In this case, the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism will examine one part of the TREMs adopted by Country E
while the Implementation Committee (or another tribunal set up by
the Protocol) and the MOP to the Montreal Protocol will examine the
overall design of the same TREMs.
In this possibility, the question of whether controversies con-
cerning conflicting jurisdictions arise remains unclear. The disputing
parties to the respective dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO
and of the Protocol are not identical. The TREMs under review by
both tribunals appear to be the same, but if more closely examined, are
actually not identical as the WTO panel will not be examining the part
of the TREMs that do not prohibit the import of refrigerators contain-
ing CFCs, which will be examined under the dispute resolution proce-
dures under the Protocol. As a result, it seems that in this case,
controversies concerning conflicting jurisdictions do not arise. 16 3 Note,
however, that an interesting scenario might arise should both the
WTO panel/Appellate Body and the Implementation Committee/MOP
find unfavorably against Country E. Technically speaking, Country E
can fulfill the requirements from both sets of rules by withdrawing the
import prohibition against all cooling equipment containing CFCs
163 However, this will depend on how one defines "conflicting or competing juris-
dictions." According to the definition of Shany, proceedings "which address simi-
lar or related disputes (i.e. similar or related sets of opposing claims) between
similar or related parties" will qualify as competing procedures. Under this defini-
tion, there might be some room to argue that this scenario might constitute com-
peting procedures employing Shany's definition. SHANY, supra note 15, at 21.
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while imposing new import prohibition of refrigerators containing
CFC. Nevertheless, this new trade regime might initiate another new
round of disputes, similar to the previous round of disputes. This pe-
culiarity does not result from controversies concerning conflicting ju-
risdictions but from controversies concerning conflicting norms.
Table 2 presents the summary of these hypothetical cases:
TABLE 2 THREE HYPOTHETICAL CASES INVOLVING THE
APPLICATION OF MULTILATERAL TREMS
WTO Member A, B C, D E, F, G
Montreal Protocol A, B C E, F
party
Measures adopted A prohibits C prohibits E prohibits
(genuine importation of importation of importation of
multilateral cooling equipment cooling equipment cooling equipment
TREMs) containing CFCs containing CFCs containing CFCs
from all countries from non-parties from non-parties,
but does not
prohibit
importation of
refrigerators
containing CFCs
from non-parties
Dispute arises B brought its D brought its G brought its
complaint against complaint against complaint against
A to the WTO, C to the WTO, E to the WTO,
A brought its C might not bring F brought its
complaint against any complaint to complaint against
B to the Montreal any international E to the Montreal
Protocol tribunals Protocol
Conflicting No conflicting No conflicting Conflicting
jurisdictions jurisdictions: jurisdictions jurisdictions?
-->different subject Dispute parties:
matters different
Subject matter:
similar but not
identical
C. Possibility of Conflicting Jurisdictions and its
the Application of TREMs
Implications to
From the analysis of several possible scenarios of the Chile-
Swordfish dispute and some hypothetical cases in the previous two
subsections, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, under most
circumstances, controversies concerning conflicting jurisdiction dis-
putes involving the application of TREMs might not arise as the sub-
ject matter under examination by the disputing parties in front of
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different tribunals might not be identical.1 6 4 Second, the negative con-
sequences to the international legal order predicted by scholars re-
garding the proliferation of international tribunals might not arise as
each tribunal mostly applies its own specialized set of legal rules.
Negative consequences do occur to states that adopt the TREMs when
conflicting rulings are rendered concerning the legality of the TREMs
in dispute. This negative implication, however, does not entirely re-
sult from the inability to resolve controversies of conflicting jurisdic-
tions. Unresolved controversies concerning conflict of norms between
the GATT/WTO and the MEAs are also part of the problem.
What are the implications of this for states that seek to use
TREMs to achieve environmental objectives? In disputes involving the
application of TREMs, it is usually those countries whose interests are
affected that initiate and bring such disputes to an international tribu-
nal against the country applying the TREMs. Considering the more
effective implementation and enforcement mechanisms under the
DSU, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO inevitably "at-
tracts" countries whose trade or economic interests are affected by the
applications of TREMs."6 ' Initial recourse to the WTO, rather than to
the ITLOS, by the EC concerning its dispute with Chile is a case in
point.16 6 As for countries that apply the TREMs, such as Chile in the
Chile-Swordfish case, such countries might not take the first initiative
to resort to any dispute settlement mechanism. Should the applica-
tions of their TREMs result in an international dispute, such countries
are unlikely to bring this dispute to the WTO as the TREMs in ques-
tion will be subject to strict scrutiny under the specialized interna-
tional trade rules and are likely to be held incompatible with the
GATT/WTO. As a result, countries adopting the TREMs are more
likely to resort to the dispute resolution procedures under the MEAs,
even if such TREMs might not be regarded as genuine multilateral
TREMs, such as the submission to the ITLOS by Chile in the Chile-
Swordfish dispute. 167
In addition, note that most MEAs do not prescribe compulsory
dispute settlement procedures and recall the hypothetical Situation C
discussed in subsection III.A where Chile could face trade retaliation
from the EC if it does not withdraw the TREMs found to be in violation
164 Note the first part of the ITLOS review in the Chile-Swordfish dispute, and
Cases 1 and 3 in the hypothetical cases.
165 See DSU, supra note 70, arts. 21, 22.
166 The EC firstly brought this dispute to the WTO. Its subsequent complaint to
the ITLOS seems to be a counter-action to Chile's action of bringing the EC to the
ITLOS. See World Trade Organization, Chile-Measures affecting the Transit
and Importing of Swordfish, www.wto.org/english/tratop/dispu-e/casese/ds193e.
htm.
167 See generally Swordfish Case, supra note 17.
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of its obligations under the GATT/WTO. All these make it highly pos-
sible that the applications of TREMs will be subject to the examination
and scrutiny of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, a situation
where countries might gradually become reluctant to use TREMs for
true environmental purposes. Furthermore, it might deeply trouble
countries that adopt, or are even legally required to adopt, the genuine
TREMs according to the mandates from the MEAs, as their implemen-
tation of international legal obligations under the MEAs will con-
stantly face threats and challenges from other countries affected by
these TREMs and that decide to bring this dispute to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. The source of this negative consequence for
countries opting for using TREMs is not entirely a result of controver-
sies concerning conflicting jurisdictions. The inability to resolve con-
troversies concerning conflicting norms between the GATT/WTO and
those MEAs containing trade measures is probably the main source of
this predicament.
Would it relieve countries adopting multilateral TREMs from
their dilemma and provide them with greater assurance if compulsory
and binding dispute settlement mechanisms were developed under the
MEAs? Take Case 3 in subsection III.B as an example and imagine
the following consequences. When Country F initiates the NCP with
regard to Country E's failure to prohibit import of refrigerators con-
taining CFCs from non-parties and the Implementation Committee
finds Country E in a state of serious non-compliance, the Committee
suggests and the MOP adopts the decision that requires Country E to
adopt a broader trade ban to include import prohibition of refrigera-
tors containing CFCs from non-parties. If Country E does not imple-
ment this decision, it could be subject to broader trade restrictive
measures from other contracting parties. Meanwhile, Country G suc-
cessfully challenged Country E's TREMs and the DSB requests the
withdrawal of such TREMs or otherwise be subjected to trade retalia-
tion from Country G. Under this scenario, whether controversies arise
from conflicting jurisdictions remains unclear, as the disputing parties
are different and the scope of TREMs under review are not identical.
However, this causes grave concern for Country E and puts it in a situ-
ation more difficult than Chile under Situation C prescribes in sub-
Section III.A. Country E needs to withdraw part of its TREMs if it
wants to avoid trade sanctions from Country G, but it needs to widen
the scope of its original TREMs if it wants to avoid trade sanctions
from all the other contracting parties to the Montreal Protocol. This
puts Country E, a country that opts for adopting TREMs according to
an MEA, in a true dilemma. In this situation, this dilemma mostly
results from the inability to resolve controversies concerning conflict-
ing norms, as conflicting jurisdictions do not even exist here.
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To summarize, a dispute arising from the application of
TREMs might not always result in controversies concerning conflicting
jurisdictions. 6 ' When it does happen, it might bring serious difficul-
ties to countries that adopt the TREMs. In a situation where compul-
sory and binding dispute settlement mechanisms do not exist in the
relevant MEAs, the effective dispute settlement mechanism of the
WTO seems capable of attracting such a dispute, which might render
countries reluctant to apply the TREMs. Ironically, the more compul-
sory and binding the dispute settlement mechanisms adopted by the
MEAs, the greater dilemma it is going to cause for countries to apply
the TREMs. The root cause of such problems is the inability to resolve
controversies concerning conflicting jurisdictions. However, as long as
controversies concerning conflicting norms remain unresolved, such
problems are only going to become worse. In other words, in the appli-
cation of the TREMs, legal controversies arising from the conflict of
norms play a very crucial role.
V. CONCLUSION
Two types of legal controversies arise in the context of disputes
arising from the applications of multilateral TREMs. First, potential
conflict may arise between two sets of substantive legal rules, the rela-
tionship between international trade rules under the GATT/WTO and
trade-related provisions under the MEAs. Second, potential conflict
may arise between jurisdictions; both the dispute settlement mecha-
nisms under the WTO and those under the MEAs can obtain jurisdic-
tion concerning disputes arising from the application of TREMs. In
the former, there has yet to be an agreed-to set of rules under the
GATT/WTO, the MEAs, or international law to solve problems con-
cerning conflicting norms. In the latter, as discussed in Section II of
this article, neither is there an agreed-to set of legal principles under
international law, the GATT/WTO or the MEAs that offer satisfactory
solutions to solve such controversies.
The following issues concerning conflicting jurisdictions over
such disputes were put forward in the Introduction of this article. Can
disputes arising from the application of TREMs be settled under both
the dispute settlement mechanisms of the WTO and of the MEAs? Is it
likely that such a dispute be subject to multiple dispute settlement
mechanisms? If the answer is yes, then does one of them have primary
jurisdiction? If none of them have primary jurisdiction, what are the
implications of conflicting jurisdictions of disputes concerning the
adopting of TREMs? After the analysis of several hypothetical cases in
Section III, this article offers the following conclusions to the above-
168 This, of course, will depend on the definition of "conflicting jurisdictions" or
.competing procedures" one adopts.
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mentioned research questions. The dispute involving the application
of multilateral TREMs does bring out the legal controversies concern-
ing conflicting jurisdictions; as such a dispute can simultaneously or
subsequently be subject to the dispute settlement mechanisms of both
the WTO and of the MEAs. However, no legal principle exists that
confers primary or sole jurisdiction to any particular dispute settle-
ment mechanism. Nevertheless, the possibility of such legal contro-
versies taking place might not be as frequent as previously thought, as
the subject matter in the respective tribunal might not be identical, or
the disputing parties might not be the same. Even if such controver-
sies take place, the negative consequences of causing a fragmentation
and inconsistency of international legal order concerned with the
proliferation of international tribunals might not be as serious as pre-
dicted, as each dispute settlement mechanism is required to apply its
own set of specialized rules to examine the dispute. However, such
controversies do bring grave concerns and a dilemma to countries that
adopt TREMs, in particular the genuine multilateral TREMs. Never-
theless, such a dilemma is also a result of the inability to resolve con-
troversies concerning conflicting norms.
In sum, to settle disputes arising from the applications of
TREMs in a manner that contributes to the overall integrity of the
international legal order and protects the legal rights of each disputing
country requires effective solutions to legal controversies concerning
both conflicting norms and conflicting jurisdictions. Solving one set of
controversies without solving the other cannot effectively address this
important issue.
